mixed stuff:
ausführlicher artikel zum thema YEN und schwäche der japanischen wirtschaft:
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009...-haven-status/
nochmal japan:
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009...-share-scheme/
Tokyo eyes share scheme
Posted by Gwen Robinson on Feb 25 04:28.
Japan’s government could buy shares to prop up the ailing stock market in a desperate attempt to limit the economic fallout from tumbling equity prices. Kaoru Yosano, the new finance minister, said the government was examining measures including
a 1960s scheme involving two consortia that spent Y400bn ($4.1bn) to shore up stock prices over two years. His comments came as Japanese share prices continued to plunge, ahead of news Wednesday that Japan’s exports plunged a quarterly 46% in January.
den katastrophalen export einbruch von 47% habt ihr ja schon erwähnt.
japan, dass immer aussenhandelsüberschüsse erwirtschaftet hat, ist nun tief in ein defizit gerutscht.
damit ergibt sich eine weitere folge: japan wird deshalb vorerst keine devisenreserven mehr ansammeln. gut möglich, dass sie deshalb in zukunft weniger treasuries kaufen werden.
nochmal zum thema banken und kapitalausstattung (siehe Bernankes gestrige kommentare zum stress test).
nur ein teil der bisher bereitgestellten staatsgelder kann wirklich verluste auffangen.
früher oder später werden (wie bei citi) die preferreds aber in common stock gewandelt werden müssen (siehe grafik), was auf jeden fall die altaktionäre diluted und zur verstaatlichung führen kann.
zum verständnis hier nochmal ein einsteiger artikel:
Tangible Common Equity for Beginners
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009...-to-core-lite/
Welcome to “core lite”
Posted by Paul Murphy on Feb 25 09:45.
As
banks seemingly everywhere talk to their governments about fresh capital injections, Simon Samuels of Citigroup has issued an untimely reminder that
this capital will only serve a purpose if it is available to absorb losses.
European banks have raised about €230bn of fresh capital since the start of 2008 - but questions remain over how much safer investors should feel. Says Samuels in a note to Citi clients:
Zitat:
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Only about half of this fresh capital can be truly considered ‘core’ — capital that can absorb losses alongside equity. The remainder of the capital injected has typically taken the form of preference shares. Why should investors care? After all, if regulators are satisfied that new capital counts as ‘core’ and keeps the Tier 1 ratio above the 4% minimum, then surely the threat of liquidation is academic? Perhaps. But issuing preference shares to replace eroded ‘core’ capital cannot carry on indefinitely. Once the equity is wiped out, preference share holders (mainly governments) face equity-style risks without an equity-style upside. This is likely to increase the risk of nationalisation.
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He quotes RBS boss Stephen Hester from a recent conference
call as saying: “Preference shares are just a disguised form of leverage…this is a penny that has still got to drop fully.” The point here being that non-core capital injections, which are then used to expand lending, increase leverage for equity investors.
Zitat:
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And, given the political pressures on banks to increase domestic lending in return for the capital injections, such loans may be suboptimally priced or allocated, in turn accelerating bad debt provisions and capital erosion. Furthermore, lopsided balance sheets, with masses of non-core capital, will need to be fixed at some stage, suggesting a further drag on RoEs even after the crisis abates. So while the threat of a systemic collapse may be receding, the picture for equity investors remains bleak.
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Here’s Samuels’ illustration of how a bank’s capital should work
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that all recent government capital injections have genuinely bolstered the core — in particular, improvements at Commerzbank, KBC, Bank of Ireland and BNP Paribas can at best be described as “core lite.”
Essentially, these banks have de-leveraged far more substantially for senior debt holders than pure equity holders. As political pressure to expand lending collides with realised losses that could spell real trouble.
Houston vergibt staatsgelder, um credit scores aufzupumpen
Pay Down Credit Cards
Joe Weisenthal|Feb. 24, 2009, 3:35 PM|11
Good lord. We have apparently learned nothing from the subprime debacle. At least the city of Houston hasn't learned anything. In a
bid to encourage homebuying,
the city is considering helping its residents pay off their credit cards so that they might get a slight bump in credit scores.
Zitat:
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The “Credit Score Enhancement Program” will give up to $3,000 in grants to individuals who are trying to qualify for mortgages through the city’s homebuyers assistance program. City officials say some applicants fall short of eligibility by only 10 or 20 points on their credit scores, and paying off some debt balances can quickly improve their numbers.
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Now granted, we think the credit score system is messed up, but seriously, the city council members that support this must mean that having a good credit score just makes you automatically credit-worthy. It's like thinking that if we give children A's on their report cards, then they'll get smart.
Oh wait, we do believe this.